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Abstract—To defend against distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attacks, one critical issue is to effectively isolate the 
attack traffic from the normal ones. A novel DDoS defense 
scheme based on TCP_IP Header Analysis and Proactive Tests 
(THAPT) is hereby proposed. Unlike most of the previous 
DDoS defense schemes that are passive in nature, the proposal 
uses proactive tests to identify and isolate the malicious traffic. 
Simulation results validate the effectiveness of our proposed 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Generally, there are four broad categories of defense 
against DoS attacks [1]:  attack prevention, attack detection, 
attack source identification, attack reaction. Next we will 
give a mainly introduction of each defense technique and 
simply analyze their advantages and limitations one by one.  
A. Prevention 
Attack prevention aims to stop attacks before they can 
reach their target. This approach assumes the source address 
of attack traffic is spoofed, so it normally comprises a 
variety of packet filtering schemes which are deployed in 
routers to make sure only valid traffic can pass through. 
This greatly reduces the chance of DDoS attacks occurring. 
However, it is not easy to specify a filtering rule that can 
differentiate spoofed traffic from legitimate traffic 
accurately. Router-based Packet Filtering (RPF) [2] extends 
ingress filtering to the core of the Internet. It is based on the 
principle that for each link in the core of the Internet, there 
is only a limited set of source addresses from which traffic 
on the link could have originated. RPF is effective against 
randomly spoofed DoS attacks. However, the filtering 
granularity of RPF is low. The aim of the Source Address 
Validity Enforcement Protocol [3] is to provide routers with 
information about the range of source IP addresses that 
should be expected at each interface. It overcomes the 
asymmetries of Internet routing by updating the incoming 
tables on each router periodically, but it needs to change the 
routing protocol. 
B. Detection 
The detection can be divided into two categories 
according to the ways used in detection. The first category is 
based on the special features of DoS attacks. MULTOPS [4] 
assumes that packet rates between two hosts are 
proportional during normal operation. SYN detection [5] 
methods detect DoS attacks by monitoring statistical 
changes. Cheng et al. [6] proposed to use spectral analysis
to identify DoS attack flows using the number of packet 
arrivals in a fixed interval as the signal. The assumption of 
the Kolmogorov test [7] is that multiple attack sources use 
the same DoS attack tool, resulting the traffic is highly 
correlated. All above detection techniques are based on one 
or more assumptions, of which most are not strong. So 
attackers can evade detection by changing their attack 
patterns. Another category is anomaly-based detection, 
which models the behavior of normal traffic, and then 
reports any anomalies. Lightweight Intrusion detection 
System [8] using the idea of an Artificial Immune System. 
C. Source Identification 
Source identification is necessary, as we known that 
blocking the attack traffic at its source is an ideal response 
when DoS attack is undergoing. There are three kinds of 
Source Identification. The first kind is IP Traceback by 
Active Interaction. Link-testing traceback [9] infers the 
attack path by flooding all links with large bursts of traffic 
and observing how this perturbs the attack traffic. The 
common shortcoming for these schemes is only suitable for 
identifying attack paths within one ISP’s network. The 
second kind is Probabilistic IP Traceback Schemes. Song 
and Perrig [10] have improved the efficiency and security of 
the PPM scheme by introducing a new hashing scheme and 
an authentication scheme. In ICMP “traceback” scheme 
[11], when a router receives a packet to a destination, the 
router generates an ICMP traceback message with low 
probability. Adjusted Probabilistic Packet Marking [12] was 
proposed to overcome a problem that is the further the 
router the less possible it is to receive a marked packet from 
that router. This kind of source identification is Vulnerable 
to marking spoofing. The third kind is Hash-Based IP 
Traceback. Snoeren et al. [13] proposed hash-based IP 
traceback, to trace individual packets by recording every 
packet at the router which it passed through. However, the 
success of traceback depends on the number of tracking 
routers installed, and the area covered by these routers. 
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According to the distance to the victim, we divide the 
location that could be employed the reaction scheme into 
three types: Victim end reaction, Intermediate network 
reaction, and Source end reaction. History-based IP Filtering
[14] proposed to filter bandwidth attack traffic according to 
the history. The challenge of victim end reaction is how to 
differentiate attack traffic from legitimate. There are three 
types of intermediate network reaction schemes: pushback 
and controller-agent schemes and secure overlay services. 
Mahajan et al. [15] provided a scheme in which routers learn 
a congestion signature that can differentiate legitimate traffic 
from malicious traffic based on the volume of traffic to the 
target from different links; the aim of an agent-controller 
model [16] is to filter attack traffic at the edge routers of one 
ISP domain. An architecture called secure overlay service 
[17] was proposed to secure the communication between the 
confirmed users and the victim. The basic assumption for 
above schemes is that there are a limited number of attack 
paths, so how to deal with distributed non-spoofed attacks 
becomes a challenge. The ultimate goal for DoS attack 
defense is to filter attack traffic at the source. D-WARD [18] 
collects flow statistics to defend DoS attack at the source. 
But how to detect an attack before attack traffic aggregation 
is a technical challenge to source end reaction. 
II. RELATED WORK
Considering the following situation, DDoS attacks are 
launched from a large army of compromised hosts, most 
attacks do not spoof source address and each host can 
behave like a “legitimate” source, attack traffic comes from 
many geographically distributed links, but the overall effect 
is a powerful DDoS attack. This attack can evade most of 
the existing detection mechanism and threaten the victim 
directly, so we can just employ the reaction scheme to 
effectively minimize attack damage at the Victim end. Most 
commercial DoS attack solutions belong to Victim end 
reaction mechanisms which are easy to implement by 
deploying at the target or routers close to the target. To 
ensure good performance and accommodate as many normal 
users as possible, it is critical to differentiate traffic and then 
treat them differently. Unfortunately, it is rather difficult to 
give an accurate classification as DoS attack traffic can 
mimic any type of legitimate traffic. Discrimination based 
on packet headers is vulnerable to IP spoofing; 
Discrimination based on packet contents may be thwarted 
by the increasing use of end-to-end encryption. Common 
types of DDoS attacks are listed as follows: TCP SYN 
Flood; UDP Flood; Ping of Death; Smurf; Teardrop and 
Land Attacks. We differentiate these attack into Connection 
oriented and Connectionless oriented, thus we treat them 
differently using different means. In this paper, a novel 
DDoS defense scheme based on TCP_IP Header Analysis 
and Proactive Tests is hereby proposed. Analyzing the 
TCP_IP Header against the well defined rules is designed to 
defend the Connectionless oriented attack, such as UDP 
flood attack. While the proactive test based differentiation 
technique was proposed to handle Connection oriented 
(TCP) attack solely because TCP protocol has the built-in 
congestion control and reliable transmission mechanism that 
we can use to test every TCP flow to distinguish whether it 
is a legitimate flow. We identify malicious traffic from their 
behaviors, such as aggressiveness that is the salient feature 
of DDoS traffic [19]. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 
presents in detail our proposal. Then we present in Section 
 some simulation results to validate our scheme. Finally, 
conclusion is presented in Section .
III. DESIGN OF THAPT 
The THAPT model’s flowchart in Fig. 1, which can be 
explained as follows: 
1) Upon the arrival of a new incoming packet, the receiver 
first determines which path to go. If it is TCP flow, go 
to 6, otherwise go to 2. 
2) Consider whether the analyzed period is within the 
considering period ( t ) or not, if not, the packet is 
admitted, otherwise go to 3. 
3) If packet within t , calculate the value of VDR. 
4) If V>v or D>d or R>r, the packet should be further 
examined by the packet rules, otherwise admit the 
packet. 
5) Consider whether packet is matched with designed 
packet rules or not, if yes, the packet should be dropped 
and then the packet rules and t will be update, 
otherwise the packet is admitted. 
6) The receiver determines whether the current packet 
belongs to a new flow or not by checking the tuple of 
(source IP address, source port number, destination IP 
address, destination port number). If it is, go to 7, 
otherwise go to 9. 
7) If it is the first packet of a flow, the receiver examines 
whether the number of admitted flows is less than the 
maximum flow count (a threshold set by the receiver to 
ensure proper provisioning of quality of service) or not , 
If not , the packet is dropped.  
8) Otherwise, the new packet is admitted after updating 
the flow table maintained by the receiver, resulting in 
an increment of the flow count by 1, and initialization 
of several counters, such as the number of successful 
tests and the number of failure tests.  
9) The receiver then checks the behavior history of the 
flow. If the number of failure tests is no less than a 
threshold, f, the packet will be dropped.  
10) For the flow whose behavior is not so bad in the past, 
our scheme further examines whether the flow has 
passed a certain number of tests, h. The receiver will 
admit directly any packet of flows having passed h tests 
successfully. 
11) For other flows whose pass_num is less than h, we 
further check the current state of the flow. If the flow is 
under a test, go to 12, otherwise go to 13. 
12) Now the proactive test will be enforced by the receiver 
by manipulating the reverse ACK rate. The aim of the 
test is to make the current rate shall not exceed one half 
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of its previous one. If the flow conforms to that 
constraint, the flow passes the current test and its 
pass_num is incremented by 1. Otherwise, the flow 
fails one test, resulting in an increment of the fail_num 
by 1 and the possibility of dropping. 
13) In the case that the flow is not in the state of being 
tested, the rate of the flow is compared with that of the 
fair share of each flow. The result of the comparison is 
used to determine the test probability for that flow. If 
the flow needs more tests, then go to 12. Or it will be 
admit because its sending rate is low. 
A. TCP_IP Header Analysis. 
Update the t
t  is the defined time period, it is used to decide how 
long the each analysis will go on. The initialization value is 
0.1 second, so most the packets will be admitted when there 
is no attack. Once attack happens, some packets will be 
dropped, resulting in an increment of t  and more packets 
will be tested by the well defined rules. 
VDR analysis 
VDR Calculating occurs per t .














We select VDR analysis on the traffic because they have 
different strengths and limitations: Volume analysis is 
suitable for the attacks that have constant attack rate, which 
is easy to detect. However, its abilities will be reduced in the 
face of variable rate attack and it is difficult to distinguish 
the difference between Flash Crowds and real DDoS traffic 
by this method; Distributed analysis function well when it is 
used in DoS attributed attack such as Smurf Attack or ICMP 
Flood. Attack commonly combines between IP Spoofing 
and Reflectors for the purpose of the best attributed of 
source IP address distribution. Distribution of source IP 
address during the attack is easy to recognize, but it is 
difficult to measure volume of the attack. If the attack 
concerns about the quantity, not distribution, such as TCP 
SYN Flood, we cannot catch such attack; Ratio analysis 
plays well its role for the attack that creates high difference 
of attack ratio such as TCP SYN Flood and Smurf Attack. 
However, this way cannot catch the some attack such as 
Land Attack or Fragile Attack. Therefore, combining 
advantages of all three methods may increase the efficiency 
of detection. 
The separate threshold of V, D and R is v, d and r. Their 
value should be defined base on the given environment and 
extensive simulations. 
Packet Rules 
First, Let us analyze the primary attack signature of 
mentioned DDoS attacks: 
1) The TCP SYN flood exploits a vulnerability of the 
TCP three-way handshake; 
2) The Smurf attack uses ICMP echo request packets 
directed to IP broadcast addresses from remote 
locations to generate denial of service attacks; 
3) ICMP and UDP Flooding sent out ICMP and UDP 
packets continually; 
4) Land attack is caused by sending a packet to a machine 
with the source address as same as the destination 
address; 
5) Teardrop exploits an overlapping IP fragment bug, 
making certain operating systems improperly 
reassemble the overlapping IP fragments with a result 
of rebooting the machine; 
6) Ping-of-death attack sends a large ICMP ping packet 
that is exceed 65535 byte, which can cause certain 
operating systems to crash, freeze, or reboot due to 
buffer overflow; 
Then, further discussion is followed: DoS attack can be 
launched in two forms [20]. The first form aims to crash a 
system by sending one or more carefully crafted packets that 
exploit software vulnerability in the target system. The 
second form is to use massive volumes of useless traffic to 
occupy all the resources that could service legitimate traffic. 
While it is possible to prevent the first form of attack by 
patching known vulnerabilities, the second form of attack 
cannot be so easily prevented. The targets can be attacked 
simply because they are connected to the public Internet. So 
Fig.  1. Flowchart of the traffic differentiation 
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we just put emphasize on the UDP and ICMP flooding 
attack here. 
Now, base on the analysis above, packet rules are made 
as followed: 
1) IP 1 = {drop | IP.SRC_IP = IP.DST_IP}. 
It is used to drop the packets whose source address is the 
same as the destination one. 
2) IP2 = {drop | IP.FLAG_MF = 1}. 
This can drop those packets have fragmented packet. 
3) ICMP = {drop | ICMP.TYPE = 8}. 
It is used to drop ICMP packets that have their type equal 
to 8 which is a echo request packet. 
4) UDP = {drop | UDP.SRC_PORT = UDP.DST_PORT}. 
It is used to drop UDP packet that the source port is 
equal to destination port. 
5) IP3 = {drop | IP.SRC_IP = SIP}. 
SIP is none initially, while it is selected dynamically to 
filtering the malicious packets by the analysis of VDR. 
When the value of Volume or Distributed or Ratio Analysis 
is high, the most related source address will be selected as 
SIP. 
B. Proactive Tests 
The threshold f and h 
It is used to prevent our scheme from falsely identifying 
the behavior of a flow. A low value of f may exacerbate 
packet dropping. In case of a false identification, subsequent 
packets from an innocent flow will be blocked. Selecting a 
too high value is unwise, either. A high f delays the packet 
dropping decision, and thus subsequent packets of a 
malicious stream may still consume system resources. 
Similarly, some tradeoff has to be made to determine a 
proper value of h. 
Calculate the rate of a flow 
It is calculated according to the following formula, num_ 
pkt*sz_pkt/t, where t is the time interval (window), 
num_pkt is the number of packets received during this 
period, and sz_pkt is the packet size. We update the starting 
time of a flow once it passes a test. In so doing, we can 
effectively thwart a low-rate DoS attack which sends a burst 
of attack packets to incite congestion and keeps silence for a 
much longer period to significantly lower its average rate in 
order to escape detection and filtering. 
Calculate the test probability 
It is fair that a flow with less bandwidth consumption should 
be tested by less numbers. The test probability for a high-rate 
flow is 1/ (pass_num+1). At the very beginning, pass_num is 
0 for all flows. Therefore, as long as a high-rate flow has not 
passed a test, its chance of being tested is 100%. As the 
number of successful tests of a flow increases, its test 
probability reduces. The test probability for the less 
resource-consumption flow is 1/max (m, 2*h), where m is 
the total number of flows. For the normal case, m is far 
greater than 2h; thus, p=1/m. We use the max() function to 
address the case that only a few flows exist in the system and 
ensure that the test probability for a low-rate flow is at most 
1/2 of that of a high-rate one. 
IV. SIMULATIONS 
To test the effectiveness of our proposed traffic 
differentiation, we set up a simulation scenario including 
two sources: Normal source and Attack source which 
contains TCP Syn, UDP and ICMP flood attack source as 
shown in Fig.2. These flows pass through the same 
bottleneck link. The difference is that one simulation uses a 
Normal sink to accept packets, and the other uses the 
THAPT sink. We set f to 3, h to 6 and increase the value 
of t  by 1 second when it will be updated. The simulation 
results are shown in Fig. 3. 
Fig.3 shows the throughput of the traffic using the 
Normal sink and the THAPT sink that we proposed, in which 
the traffic throughput of THAPT sink drops drastically after 
2 minutes, then after some minutes, the traffic becomes 
stabilized. In contrast, using the Normal sink as the receiver, 
the attacker may keep the highest throughput during its 
lifetime. The result demonstrates the effectiveness of our 
proposed traffic differentiation. 
Fig. 3. Traffic throughput of Normol and THAPT Sink 
Fig.2. Simulation for comparison study of the effectiveness of THAPT
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V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we first analyzed four categories of defense 
against DDoS attacks. After that, a novel DDoS defense 
scheme has been presented. The salient benefits of our 
proposal mainly lie in its capability of defending malicious 
flows. Preliminary simulation results have validated our 
design. 
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